Does alleviating poverty increase cognitive performance? Short- and long-term evidence from a randomized controlled trial.

In this Registered Report, we investigated the impact of a cash transfer based poverty alleviation program on cognitive performance. We analyzed data from a randomized controlled trial conducted on low-income, high-risk individuals in Liberia where a random half of the participants (n = 251) received a $200 lump-sum unconditional cash transfer - equivalent approximately to 300% of their monthly income - while the other half (n = 222) did not. We tested both the short-term (2-5 weeks) and the long-term (12-13 months) impact of the treatment via several executive function measures. The observed effect sizes of cash transfers on cognitive performance (b = .13 for the short- and b = .08 for the long-term) were roughly three and four times smaller than suggested by prior non-randomized research. Bayesian analyses revealed that the overall evidence supporting the existence of these effects is inconclusive. A multiverse analysis showed that neither alternative analytical specifications nor alternative processing of the dataset changed the results consistently. However cognitive performance varied between the executive function measures, suggesting that cash transfers may affect the subcomponents of executive function differently.

Correction to: 'Raising the value of research studies in psychological science by increasing the credibility of research reports: The Transparent Psi Project' (2023) by Kekecs et al.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1098/rsos.191375.][This corrects the article DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2022.2500.].

Raising the value of research studies in psychological science by increasing the credibility of research reports: the transparent Psi project.

The low reproducibility rate in social sciences has produced hesitation among researchers in accepting published findings at their face value. Despite the advent of initiatives to increase transparency in research reporting, the field is still lacking tools to verify the credibility of research reports. In the present paper, we describe methodologies that let researchers craft highly credible research and allow their peers to verify this credibility. We demonstrate the application of these methods in a multi-laboratory replication of Bem's Experiment 1 (Bem 2011 J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 100, 407-425. (doi:10.1037/a0021524)) on extrasensory perception (ESP), which was co-designed by a consensus panel including both proponents and opponents of Bem's original hypothesis. In the study we applied direct data deposition in combination with born-open data and real-time research reports to extend transparency to protocol delivery and data collection. We also used piloting, checklists, laboratory logs and video-documented trial sessions to ascertain as-intended protocol delivery, and external research auditors to monitor research integrity. We found 49.89% successful guesses, while Bem reported 53.07% success rate, with the chance level being 50%. Thus, Bem's findings were not replicated in our study. In the paper, we discuss the implementation, feasibility and perceived usefulness of the credibility-enhancing methodologies used throughout the project.

A review of applications of the Bayes factor in psychological research.

The last 25 years have shown a steady increase in attention for the Bayes factor as a tool for hypothesis evaluation and model selection. The present review highlights the potential of the Bayes factor in psychological research. We discuss six types of applications: Bayesian evaluation of point null, interval, and informative hypotheses, Bayesian evidence synthesis, Bayesian variable selection and model averaging, and Bayesian evaluation of cognitive models. We elaborate what each application entails, give illustrative examples, and provide an overview of key references and software with links to other applications. The article is concluded with a discussion of the opportunities and pitfalls of Bayes factor applications and a sketch of corresponding future research lines. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Algorithm-based advice taking and clinical judgement: impact of advice distance and algorithm information.

Evidence-based algorithms can improve both lay and professional judgements and decisions, yet they remain underutilised. Research on advice taking established that humans tend to discount advice-especially when it contradicts their own judgement ("egocentric advice discounting")-but this can be mitigated by knowledge about the advisor's past performance. Advice discounting has typically been investigated using tasks with outcomes of low importance (e.g. general knowledge questions) and students as participants. Using the judge-advisor framework, we tested whether the principles of advice discounting apply in the clinical domain. We used realistic patient scenarios, algorithmic advice from a validated cancer risk calculator, and general practitioners (GPs) as participants. GPs could update their risk estimates after receiving algorithmic advice. Half of them received information about the algorithm's derivation, validation, and accuracy. We measured weight of advice and found that, on average, GPs weighed their estimates and the algorithm equally-but not always: they retained their initial estimates 29% of the time, and fully updated them 27% of the time. Updating did not depend on whether GPs were informed about the algorithm. We found a weak negative quadratic relationship between estimate updating and advice distance: although GPs integrate algorithmic advice on average, they may somewhat discount it, if it is very different from their own estimate. These results present a more complex picture than simple egocentric discounting of advice. They cast a more optimistic view of advice taking, where experts weigh algorithmic advice and their own judgement equally and move towards the advice even when it contradicts their own initial estimates.

Using cancer risk algorithms to improve risk estimates and referral decisions.

Background: Cancer risk algorithms were introduced to clinical practice in the last decade, but they remain underused. We investigated whether General Practitioners (GPs) change their referral decisions in response to an unnamed algorithm, if decisions improve, and if changing decisions depends on having information about the algorithm and on whether GPs overestimated or underestimated risk. Methods: 157 UK GPs were presented with 20 vignettes describing patients with possible colorectal cancer symptoms. GPs gave their risk estimates and inclination to refer. They then saw the risk score of an unnamed algorithm and could update their responses. Half of the sample was given information about the algorithm's derivation, validation, and accuracy. At the end, we measured their algorithm disposition. We analysed the data using multilevel regressions with random intercepts by GP and vignette. Results: We find that, after receiving the algorithm's estimate, GPs' inclination to refer changes 26% of the time and their decisions switch entirely 3% of the time. Decisions become more consistent with the NICE 3% referral threshold (OR 1.45 [1.27, 1.65], p < .001). The algorithm's impact is greatest when GPs have underestimated risk. Information about the algorithm does not have a discernible effect on decisions but it results in a more positive GP disposition towards the algorithm. GPs' risk estimates become better calibrated over time, i.e., move closer to the algorithm. Conclusions: Cancer risk algorithms have the potential to improve cancer referral decisions. Their use as learning tools to improve risk estimates is promising and should be further investigated.

Situational factors shape moral judgements in the trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western countries in a culturally diverse sample.

The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements.

Is there evidence for cross-domain congruency sequence effect? A replication of Kan et al. (2013).

Exploring the mechanisms of cognitive control is central to understanding how we control our behaviour. These mechanisms can be studied in conflict paradigms, which require the inhibition of irrelevant responses to perform the task. It has been suggested that in these tasks, the detection of conflict enhances cognitive control resulting in improved conflict resolution of subsequent trials. If this is the case, then this so-called congruency sequence effect can be expected to occur in cross-domain tasks. Previous research on the domain-generality of the effect presented inconsistent results. In this study, we provide a multi-site replication of three previous experiments of Kan et al. (Kan IP, Teubner-Rhodes S, Drummey AB, Nutile L, Krupa L, Novick JM 2013 Cognition 129, 637-651) which test congruency sequence effect between very different domains: from a syntactic to a non-syntactic domain (Experiment 1), and from a perceptual to a verbal domain (Experiments 2 and 3). Despite all our efforts, we found only partial support for the claims of the original study. With a single exception, we could not replicate the original findings; the data remained inconclusive or went against the theoretical hypothesis. We discuss the compatibility of the results with alternative theoretical frameworks.

Registered Replication Report of Weissman, D. H., Jiang, J., & Egner, T. (2014). Determinants of congruency sequence effects without learning and memory confounds.

The congruency sequence effect (CSE) refers to the finding that the effect of cognitive conflict is smaller following conflicting, incongruent trials than after non-conflicting, congruent trials in conflict tasks, such as the Stroop, Simon, and flanker tasks. This is typically interpreted as an upregulation of cognitive control in response to conflict. Weissman, Jiang, & Egner (2014) investigated whether the CSE appears in these three tasks and a further variant where task-irrelevant distractors precede the target (prime-probe task), in the absence of learning and memory confounds in samples collected online. They found significant CSEs only in the prime-probe and Simon tasks, suggesting that the effect is more robust in tasks where the distractor can be translated into a response faster than the target. In this Registered Replication Report we collected data online from samples approx. 2.5 times larger than in the original study for each of the four tasks to investigate whether the task-related differences in the magnitude of the CSE are replicable (Nmin = 115, Nmax = 130). Our findings extend but do not contradict the original results: Bayesian analyses suggested that the CSE was present in all four tasks in RT but only in the Simon task in accuracy. The size of the effect did not differ between tasks, and the size of the congruency effect was not correlated with the size of the CSE across participants. These findings suggest it might be premature to conclude that the difference in the speed of distractor- vs target-related response activation is a determinant of the size of cross-trial modulations of control. The practical implications of our results for online data collection in cognitive control research are also discussed.

Can hypnotic suggestibility be measured online?

Hypnosis and hypnotic suggestions are gradually gaining popularity within the consciousness community as established tools for the experimental manipulation of illusions of involuntariness, hallucinations and delusions. However, hypnosis is still far from being a widespread instrument; a crucial hindrance to taking it up is the amount of time needed to invest in identifying people high and low in responsiveness to suggestion. In this study, we introduced an online assessment of hypnotic response and estimated the extent to which the scores and psychometric properties of an online screening differ from an offline one. We propose that the online screening of hypnotic response is viable as it reduces the level of responsiveness only by a slight extent. The application of online screening may prompt researchers to run large-scale studies with more heterogeneous samples, which would help researchers to overcome some of the issues underlying the current replication crisis in psychology.

Signatures of alcohol use in the structure and neurochemistry of insular cortex: a correlational study.

RATIONALE: Insular cortex supports the representation of motivational feelings through the integration of interoceptive information concerning bodily physiology. Compromised insular integrity is implicated in alcohol and drug use disorders. Alcohol-associated insular dysfunction may arise through aberrant glutamatergic neurotransmission associated with selective neuronal death and atrophy. OBJECTIVE: In a sample of alcohol users, we combined magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) with voxel and surface-based morphometry (VBM, SBM) to test the hypothesis that the neurochemical and structural properties of the insula relate to alcohol use. METHODS: Twenty-three healthy individuals were characterized by measures of alcohol use and subjective craving. Right mid-insula glutamate/glutamine (Glx) and total N-acetylaspartate/N-acetyl-aspartylglutamate (TNAA) concentrations were measured using MRS. Right insular structure was quantified using VBM and SBM parameters. We tested for predictive associations between these neuroimaging and behavioral/psychometric measures using Bayesian statistics. RESULTS: Reduced insular Glx concentration was associated with increased alcohol compulsions and, to a lesser extent, with greater alcohol use severity. Anecdotal evidence for a negative relationship between alcohol use severity and levels of insular gyrification was also observed. CONCLUSIONS: This study is, to date, the first characterization of the neurochemical and morphological integrity of insular cortex in alcohol users. Our data seem to reveal a negative relationship between alcohol use and the neurochemical and structural integrity of the insula, a critical substrate for motivational behavior. These neurobiological characteristics might contribute to loss of control toward compulsive drinking with prolonged and excessive alcohol use.

Is action execution part of the decision-making process? An investigation of the embodied choice hypothesis.

In this study, we aimed to explore whether action execution is an inherent part of the decision-making process. According to the hypothesis of embodied choice, the decision-making process is bidirectional as action dynamics exert their backward influence on decision processes through changing the cost and value of the potential options. This influence takes place as moving toward one option increases the commitment to and, therefore, the likelihood of choosing that option. This commitment effect can be the result of either (a) the continuous act of getting closer to this option or (b) the increased movement cost associated with changing the movement direction to select a different option. To disentangle the potential influence of these two factors, we developed the Guided Movement Task, a choice task designed to bias participant's computer-mouse movements by constraining the allowed movement space by a corridor. Using this task, we created different conditions in which the participants' mouse cursor, after being guided toward one of the options, either had equal or unequal distances to the choice options. By this manipulation, we could test whether the continuous act of getting closer to an option in itself is sufficient to influence people's decisions-a claim of "strong embodiment." In two experiments, we found that the likelihood of choosing an option only increased when the distances between the two options were unequal after the initial movement but not when they were equal. These results disagree with the hypothesis that action execution is an inherent part of the decision-making process. (PsycINFO Database Record

Estimating the evidential value of significant results in psychological science.

Quantifying evidence is an inherent aim of empirical science, yet the customary statistical methods in psychology do not communicate the degree to which the collected data serve as evidence for the tested hypothesis. In order to estimate the distribution of the strength of evidence that individual significant results offer in psychology, we calculated Bayes factors (BF) for 287,424 findings of 35,515 articles published in 293 psychological journals between 1985 and 2016. Overall, 55% of all analyzed results were found to provide BF > 10 (often labeled as strong evidence) for the alternative hypothesis, while more than half of the remaining results do not pass the level of BF = 3 (labeled as anecdotal evidence). The results estimate that at least 82% of all published psychological articles contain one or more significant results that do not provide BF > 10 for the hypothesis. We conclude that due to the threshold of acceptance having been set too low for psychological findings, a substantial proportion of the published results have weak evidential support.